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Eurosceptic attitudes are widespread in the Nordic states,
but there is a high level of variation between countries.
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While the United Kingdom has been the focus for most discussions about Euroscepticism,
citizens in the Nordic states have also displayed notable Eurosceptic attitudes. As part of our
collaborative project exploring contemporary Euroscepticism, Benjamin Leruth assesses
public opinion in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. He finds that attitudes
vary significantly, with citizens tending to be particularly critical of European policies which
their country has opted out of. There also appears to be little public support for Iceland or
Norway joining the EU in the near future. 
Throughout 2012, the growth of  Euroscepticism was a persistent theme. Indeed in the latest
Eurobarometer poll, only 31 to 33 per cent of  respondents indicated that they tend to trust the European
Union. Among those responses, it is possible to compare public support among the f ive Nordic States:
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. While these countries are commonly considered as a
bloc with similar socio-cultural and polit ical values, they have all opted f or a dif f erent level of  European
integration.
Denmark
Denmark joined the European Community in 1973, and has had no less than six ref erendums on issues
related to European integration since 1972, the last one being held in 2000 on adopting the single
currency. Two out of  those six ref erendums saw a victory f or the “no” side (Maastricht and the adoption
of  the euro). Following the outcome of  the Maastricht ref erendum, Denmark negotiated opt-outs f rom
the Maastricht Treaty through the Edinburgh Agreement.
Interestingly enough, recent
Eurobarometer results show that
Danes are not among the strongest
Eurosceptics within the EU. Indeed, in
November 2012, 48 per cent of
respondents claimed that they tend to
trust the European Union, which
corresponds to 15 per cent more than
the EU average. This trend is
conf irmed by previous Eurobarometer
results, and in 2009, 65 per cent of  the
respondents said that Denmark’s
membership to the EU is a good thing,
ranking the country among the most
posit ive EU member states.
However, Danes are much more crit ical
regarding specif ic policy areas such as
the EMU (30 per cent in f avour, in comparison to 53 per cent in f avour f or the whole of  the EU) and a
common f oreign policy (46 per cent, against 64 per cent f or the whole of  the EU). Contrary to Denmark’s
polit ical situation, 60 per cent of  respondents are in f avour of  the Common Security and Def ence Policy
(CSDP) among EU member states, despite the country opting out of  the CSDP through the Edinburgh
Agreement.
Finland
Finland joined the European Union in 1995 af ter 56.9 per cent of  the population voted in f avour of  EU
membership. In contrast to Denmark, Sweden and Norway, Finland does not have a “ref erendum
tradition”. The country is the most integrated Nordic state, and is thus considered as less resistant to
European integration than its Scandinavian neighbours.
Eurobarometer results tend to show that the Finnish population is actually more Eurosceptic than those
in Denmark. Indeed, in November 2012, 47 per cent of  respondents said they tend to trust the EU, a
trend that has remained quite stable f or the past three years. Regarding the benef its of  EU membership,
the Finnish population is much more sceptical: between 2000 and 2009, 37 to 51 per cent of  respondents
believed that Finland’s membership is good f or their country: results that were generally below Sweden,
Denmark and the EU average throughout these years.
The Finnish population is currently the most posit ive towards Economic and Monetary Union, with 76 per
cent of  respondents being in f avour of  this policy area. As Finland is the only Nordic state which has
adopted the single currency, it is no surprise to see such a dif f erence f rom attitudes in the other Nordic
EU states, Denmark and Sweden. Just as it is the case f or Denmark and Sweden, the Finnish population
is opposed to a common f oreign policy (41 per cent are in f avour). Finally, respondents seem more
sceptical towards the development of  a Common Security and Def ence Policy (with 52 per cent in f avour)
than the EU average (73 per cent in f avour).
Iceland
Iceland applied f or EU membership f or the f irst t ime during its history in 2009, and accession
negotiations are still underway. Currently, Iceland’s relationship with the European Union is mostly
shaped through the European Economic Area (EEA) and Schengen agreements. As a non-member state,
data available through Eurobarometer polling is less extensive; however, it is possible to analyse trends
regarding public support f or EU membership.
Recent opinion polls suggest that less than a third of  the Icelandic population is in f avour of  EU
membership. This trend is conf irmed by data available in the latest Eurobarometer: 26 per cent of
respondents believe that Iceland’s membership would be a good thing, 33 per cent believe that Iceland
would benef it f rom joining the EU and 34 per cent trust the European Union. Since the Icelandic
government submitted the application, public support has declined drastically and it is expected that the
relationship with the European Union will be a major issue during the upcoming parliamentary elections,
which will be held in April.
Norway
Similarly to Iceland, Norway is not a member of  the European Union; however, the country has applied on
three separate occasions f or EU membership. In 1972 and 1994, the population rejected EC/EU
membership with 53.5 and 52.2 per cent of  the electorate voting ‘no’. Norway still remains a close partner
of  the European Union, mostly through the EEA and Schengen agreements. Since the 1994 ref erendum,
the issue of  EU membership has remained largely of f  the agenda. Public support f or EU membership is
very low: in July 2012, 17.2 per cent of  respondents to a national survey said they would vote in f avour
of  EU membership, with 74.8 per cent against. This illustrates why EU membership is not discussed in the
polit ical sphere: ef f ectively, since 1994, government coalit ion agreements include a “suicide clause” on
the EU question.
Sweden
Sweden has been a member of  the European Union since 1995: in the 1994 ref erendum on EU
membership, 52.3 per cent of  the population voted ‘yes’. The country has negotiated an inf ormal opt-out
of  the Eurozone by not joining ERM II. In 2003, when the population was asked whether Sweden should
join the Economic and Monetary Union, 55.9 per cent voted against. As a result, Sweden’s de f acto opt-
out remained in place.
The latest Eurobarometer poll suggests that 33 per cent of  Swedes trust the European Union, which
corresponds to the EU average. In 2009, 57 per cent of  respondents said that Sweden’s membership is
good f or the country. As expected f ollowing the 2003 ref erendum, the most “Eurosceptic” result is
related to Economic and Monetary Union: only 23 per cent of  respondents are in f avour of  EMU. Recent
national surveys show more crit ical results: 82.3 per cent of  the population opposes EMU membership,
while the situation was even more negative in 2009. Furthermore, only 37 per cent of  respondents are in
f avour of  a common f oreign policy, and 54 per cent are in f avour of  the CSDP. Both results are largely
below the EU average.
Conclusions
Euroscepticism is a highly complex concept, which covers many aspects that are not outlined in
Eurobarometer polls or other surveys. In order to explain why mass Euroscepticism is higher in Norway
or Iceland f or instance, many f actors should be considered such as economic incentives to join, socio-
economic cleavages between the EU and the state, or cultural particularism.
Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some broad conclusions f rom the above discussion. First, issues of
sovereignty and self -determination seem to shape public opinion on European issues. Eurobarometer
results indicate that this is the case f or the three EU Nordic states (e.g. public support f or a common
f oreign policy and the CSDP), while several studies have shown that national sovereignty played a key
role in the 1994 ref erendum in Norway. Second, Nordic populations seem to have crit ical views on
policies they opted out f rom. The only exception to that rule would be the Danes’ perception of  the
CSDP. Third, even though Finland is the most integrated Nordic state, the Finnish population is more
crit ical than its EU neighbours regarding the benef its of  EU membership. Finally, current trends show that
due to low levels of  public support, Iceland’s accession to the EU is unlikely to happen in the short term.
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